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NOTES
PUBLIC FIGURES AND THE PASSAGE OF TIME
The first amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
the right of freedom of expression.1 The privilege of free speech and
press, however, frequently conflicts with the right of a private in-
dividual to protect his reputation.2 The United States Supreme Court
has attempted to reconcile the conflict between the first amendment and
the law of defamation by distinguishing between public and private
figures.' The Supreme Court has held that once an individual enters the
public limelight, he becomes a public figure and forfeits his right to re-
main free from certain defamatory statements.4 In recent years, the
question has arisen whether such a forfeiture is an irrevocable act, or
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press. Id.
2 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1967). The Supreme Court stated
that the tension between the law of defamation and the first amendment arises over the op-
posing values at stake. Id. The Court recognized that the interest in preserving one's good
name and sense of self-esteem frequently, and often unavoidably, comes into conflict with
the need to keep the public informed. Id. at 149. According to one commentator, three
separate theories have developed to deal with the conflict between the law of libel and
freedom of speech. Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of
Balancing Libel Law and The First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 779 (1975). The first
interpretation is Justice Black's "absolute" theory. Id. The Justice advocates a literal ap-
proach to the first amendment. Id. In a concurring opinion to New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, Justice Black applied the "absolute" theory, stating that all speech should be pro-
tected regardless of whether it was maliciously published. Id. at 780; see text accompanying
notes 15-19 infra. The second theory is Professor Emerson's balancing theory. Brosnahan,
supra, at 780. Under this method the court would weigh the interest in freedom of expres-
sion against the benefits received by restricting such expression. Id. The third is Professor
Meiklejohn's theory of absolute privilege in matters of "governing importance." Id. at 779.
This theory emanates from the principle of self government. Id. at 780. Under Meiklejohn's
theory, a defamatory remark which relates to an issue dealing with government is absolutely
privileged. Id. A strictly private matter, however, is subject to legislative restrictions. Id.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974). The Court has attempted to ac-
comodate the competing interests by basing the distinction between public and private
figures on the rationale that public figures not only have access to the media, which private
citizens lack, but also that public figures are presumed to have assumed the risk of defama-
tion upon entering the public eye. Id. at 325; see text accompanying notes 45-49 infra. One
commentator has described the public figure theory as an amorphous concept which has
rendered application of the doctrine difficult. See Bamberger, Public Figures and the Law
of Libe A Concept in Search of a Definition, 33 Bus. LAW. 709, 709 (1978).
See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
154-55 (1967). A public figure is protected only from false statements or statements made in
reckless disregard of the truth. See text accompanying notes 15-48 infra.
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whether the passage of time serves to reinvest the public figure with the
right to protect his reputation.'
At common law, defamation was a part of the tort law of strict liability."
The courts regarded certain classes of falsehoods to be defamatory per
se,7 whereupon the court presumed that the mere act of publication caused
damage to the plaintiff.' The only defenses recognized were truth, con-
sent, and certain absolute and conditional privileges.' One such privilege
was the qualified right of "fair comment."'" The "fair comment" privilege
' See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, 443 U.S. 157, 170 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring opinion); Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1235
(6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3477 (December 15, 1981); Brewer v. Memphis
Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3112 (1981); Time,
Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir. 1971).
1 L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3, at 4 n.12 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L.
ELDREDGE]. As early as the reign of Alfred the Great, in 880 A.D., courts in Anglo Saxon
England recognized an action for defamation at common law. Id. Dooms from the reign of
Alfred the Great set the penalty for uttering a defamatory statement at the loss of one's
tongue. Id. The English and American common law systems followed the principle that
whenever a man publishes he does so at his peril. Id. at 15. In 1974, however, the Supreme
Court held in Gertz that the first amendment prohibits the imposition of "liability without
fault" on a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private in-
dividual. Id. at 25. In modern tort law, a defamatory communication is one which tends to
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
559 (1977).
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 762-63 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as W. PROSSER]. A majority of states have held that any publication whose defamatory
effect is clear on its face is defamatory per se, and thus actionable without proof of damages.
Id. In some states the courts have drawn a distinction between publications libelous per se
and libelous per quod. Id. The courts did not view the latter category as inherently
defamatory. Id. The plaintiff was required to demonstrate a defamatory meaning, whether
through interpretation, or proof of reference to plaintiff. Id. at 746-51. Even in states adher-
ing to the per se-per quod distinction, the law has considered certain imputations to be in-
variably defamatory per se. Id. These imputations include any allegation that plaintiff has
committed a crime of moral turpitude; contracted a loathesome disease; improperly or il-
legally conducted his trade, business or profession; or behaved in an unchaste manner. Id. at
754-62.
' Id. at 766. "Publication" is defined as the communication of defamatory material to a
third party, whether oral, in print, or conveyed through electronic means or gestures. Id.
I See 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS § 96, at 79 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1
A. HANSON]. A rebuttable presumption exists in defamation cases that the statements com-
plained of were false and that plaintiff did not consent to their utterance. Id. The defendant
may defeat the action by proving either that the statement was true or that plaintiff con-
sented to its publication. Id. The defendant, however, may advance the defense of privilege
even though the plaintiff has proven every element of the tort. Id. The absoluteness or con-
tingency of the immunity depends on the degree of interest society has in certain situations.
Id. An absolute privilege exists for judicial and legislative proceedings, political broadcasts,
executive communications, and certain relationships such as between husband and wife. Id.
at 85-93. In certain cases the privilege is conditional, and is predicated on whether the
publication is done for a proper purpose and in a reasonable manner. Id. at 95.
'o Id. at 103. The conditional right of fair comment protects expression of opinion on
matters of public concern. 1 A. HANSON, supra note 9, § 137, at 102. Persons, institutions, or
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protected comment upon matters of public concern, including the con-
duct and qualifications of public officials and employees." Traditionally,
courts limited the privilege to opinion, criticism, and comment, declining
to extend protection to false assertions of fact." A minority of courts,
however, held that the "fair comment" privilege protected even false
statements of fact as long as the declarant made them in the interest of
the public and with an honest belief in their truth. 3 In 1964, the Supreme
groups who have voluntarily thrust themselves into public issues or affect the community
welfare are subject to the privilege. Id. A minority of courts have applied the privilege of
fair comment to cases involving mere curiosity rather than issues of public concern. Id. The
general rule does not approve of such an extension of the fair comment privilege. Id. Some
commentators have stated that in a strict sense the fair comment privilege does not encom-
pass instances of defamation. See M. NEWELL, SLANDER & LIBEL § 480, at 519 (4th ed. 1924)
[hereinafter cited as M. NEWELL]; C. GATLEY, LIBEL & SLANDER § 581, at 322 (5th ed. 1960).
The argument is that as long as the defendant restricts the criticism to an individual's work
and does not impinge on his moral or professional integrity, there is no libel because there is
no defamation of the man himself. M. NEWELL, supra, § 580, at 519. When the comment on
the individual's work becomes an attack on his private character, however, the element of
malice transforms the language into libel. Id.
" 1 A. HANSON, supra note 9, at 104; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 607-10
(1977). The privilege of fair comment applies to public officials, political candidates, com-
munity leaders from the private sector, private entities which are involved with the public
welfare, persons taking a public position on a matter of community concern, and those such
as artists, performers and athletes who display their talents to the public. 1 A. HANSON,
supra note 9, § 137, at 102.
" Owens v. Scott Pub. Co., 46 Wash.2d 666, - , 284 P.2d 296, 304 (1955) (court refus-
ed to recede from majority rule which offers public officials protection from the infliction of
irreparable harm caused by false statements), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 968 (1956); A.S. Abell
Co. v. Kirby, 227 Md. 267, _ , 176 A.2d 340, 342-43 (1961) (court followed majority rule and
held defamatory misstatement of fact cannot be defended successfully as fair comment);
Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, -, 75 N.E.2d 257, 260 (1947) (no question of fair com-
ment involved where defendant's statement about plaintiff consists of comment or criticism
based on false facts); Westropp v. E.W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, -, 74 N.E.2d 340,
346 (1947) (court held untruth cannot be basis of fair criticism); Murphy v. Farmers Ed. &
Coop. Union of America, North Dakota Division, 72 N.E.2d 636, 647-48 (1955) (statements
purporting to be facts cannot be said to be fair comment of public official when such
statements are not based on factual foundation). The courts' refusal to extend protection to
false assertions of facts was based on the rationale that people in the public spotlight would
be deterred from seeking public office if made victims of misstatements of fact, thereby
harming the public welfare. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 819.
" W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 819. The minority position held that public interest
demanded that those who are in a position to furnish information about public servants
should not be deterred by fear of having to prove the truth of what they say in court: Id. at
820; 1 A. HANSON, supra note 9, at 106. The leading case holding that false statements of
facts were privileged was Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). In Coleman,
the publisher of a newspaper circulated an article reciting facts relating to the character of
a state officer who was running for reelection. Id. at 286-88. While the statements made in
the article were untrue in fact and derogatory, the defendant's actions were held to be
privileged since he had acted in good faith. Id See also Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal.
565, -. , 198 P. 1, 3-5 (1921) (statement made in honest belief and without malice that public
official committed crime privileged); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142
Conn. 605, -, 116 A.2d 440, 445 (1955) (privilege of fair comment extends to libelous
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Court adopted this minority position in New York Times v. Sullivan."
In the seminal New York Times decision, the Supreme Court raised
the common law privilege of "fair comment" regarding public officials to
constitutional stature." The Court held that a public official must prove
"actual malice" before the law would impose liability in situations involv-
ing erroneous factual statements.'7 The actual malice standard, as set
forth by the Court, requires a showing by the plaintiff that the declarant
knew the allegedly defamatory statement was false or that the defen-
dant made such statement with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity
of the statement. 8 The rationale behind the Court's adoption of the
misstatements of fact, if made in good faith, without malice and with honest belief that they
are true); Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, -, 277 N.W. 264, 268 (1938) (plaintiff
must prove not only that statements were false, but that they were also published
maliciously); Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N.H. 67, -, 121 A. 92, 96 (1923) (false statements
held to be privileged if made with reasonable belief in truth of statements).
" 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964).
" Id. at 254. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the plaintiff was one of three elected
commissioners of the city of Montgomery, Alabama. Id. at 256. Sullivan brought an action
against the New York Times for publishing allegedly defamatory statements in an adver-
tisement which attacked the actions of police in Montgomery during a civil rights
demonstration. Id. The Supreme Court held that the first amendment prohibits states from
allowing public officials to recover damages for defamatory falsehoods relating to their of-
ficial conduct unless the plaintiffs prove the statements were made with "actual malice." Id.
" See Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment In Praise of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 201 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Robertson]; Comment,
Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine Revisited, 54 TUL. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine]. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts describes the impact of the Constitution upon defamation actions in two ways.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A, comment e (1977). One approach is to hold that the
Constitution limits the plaintiff by requiring him to show the statement does not come
within the limitation. Id. The other method is to refer to the Constitution as establishing a
privilege for the defendant. Id. The defendant would not be liable if he fell within the boun-
daries of the privilege. Id. The Restatement recognizes that the usage of the word privilege
may be misleading. Id. One commentator has stated that the Supreme Court's identification
of the privilege as constitutional is a misnomer. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 6, § 53, at 293.
Eldredge maintains that ordinarily defendant, not plaintiff, carries the burden of asserting
affirmative defenses. Id. In defamation actions, however, the plaintiff is burdened with
pleading and proving the existence of facts establishing defendant's violation of the ap-
plicable standard of liability. Id.
1 376 U.S. at 279. In affording protection to false assertions of fact, the New York
Times decision succeeded in expanding the privilege of fair comment far beyond its common
law bounds. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 6, at 254. Not only did the Supreme Court alter the
common law by extending protection to erroneous statements of fact, but the Court also
changed the common law by requiring that the defamed public official prove "actual malice"
with convincing clarity and not simply by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
,1 Robertson, supra note 16, at 203. The New York Times standard of "actual malice"
is very different from the common law meanings of either "malice" or "recklessness." Id.
"Actual malice" is a shorthand expression for knowing or reckless falsity, and is not
equivalent to the common law's "actual malice," which is usually defined as a bad or corrupt
motive, personal spite, ill will, or a desire to injure. Id. Proving common law "actual malice"
will not satisfy the New York Times standard. Id. In St. Amant v. Thompson, the Supreme
Court defined reckless disregard for the truth as requiring sufficient evidence to permit the
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malice standard was that freedom of expression is a fundamental and
essential element of any democracy and must therefore be accorded due
breathing space.19
The Supreme Court extended the "actual malice" rule formulated in
New York Times to embrace defamatory actions involving "public
figures" in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts" and Associated Press v.
Walker.2' In weighing the competing interests of the first amendment
and the law of defamation, the Court found in favor of freedom of expres-
sion.' The Court reasoned that public figures, like public officials, are
often major forces in the ordering of society and, thus, should be held to
the same standard as public officials.' The Court stated that since public
figures are not accountable to a political system, public scrutiny of their
conduct is perhaps the only available means by which society can
monitor their activities. 4 In determining whether a plaintiff qualifies as
a public figure, the Supreme Court examined the means of self-defense
available to a plaintiff and his conduct in relation to the controversy."
The Court alluded to the ability of public figures to command access to
channels of communication and thereby expose false and fallacious
statements. The Supreme Court also considered whether the plaintiffs
activities were purposeful and thus amounted to a voluntary thrusting of
himself into the controversy.7
conclusion that the defendant, in fact, entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication. St. Amant v. Thompson, 309 U.S. 727, 730 (1968); see L. ELDREDGE, supra note 6,
at 254.
" 376 U.S. at 269-70. The Supreme Court stated that freedom of debate on public
issues is not only a privilege but a duty of citizens. Id. The Court emphasized the need for
unfettered public debate and reiterated the principle set forth by James Madison that
"some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance
is this more true than in that of the press." Id. at 271.
= 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Curtis involved a Saturday Evening Post article which accused
Butts, the athletic director of the University of Georgia, of conspiring to fix a football game.
Id. at 135. Since a private alumni association, and not the state, was responsible for the hir-
ing and salary of Butts, the Court stated that Butts could not be labeled a public official. Id.
at 154-55. The Court, however, held that public interest in education in general, and in the
conduct of the athletic affairs of educational institutions in particular, justifies the discus-
sion of persons involved in controversies related to education. Id. at 146.
21 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Walker, the plaintiff brought suit against the Associated
Press for the issuance of an erroneous news dispatch which stated that plaintiff personally
led a demonstration against federal marshals in an attempt to block the desegregation of
the University of Mississippi. Id. at 141. Walker was a former major general who, since he
had resigned from the army, was no longer a public official. Id. at 146. The Court, however,
held that the public had a strong interest in being informed about the events and per-
sonalities involved in the Mississippi rioting and held that discussion of such a matter was
protected by the New York Times standard of actual malice. Id.
' Id. at 162-64 (Warren, J., concurring opinion); see Note, Public Figures, Private
Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN. L. REv. 157, 187 (1977).
" 388 U.S. at 164.
24 Id.
Id. at 154.
'" Id. at 155; text accompanying notes 39-45 infra.
27 388 U.S. at 155; text accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
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The next step in the evolution of the public figure doctrine occurred
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.28 In Rosenbloom, the Supreme Court
shifted the focus of the public figure doctrine, thereby giving rise to the
"public interest" test.29 Declining to concentrate on the plaintiffs status
as a private or public figure, the Court emphasized the nature of the con-
troversy involved." The Court stated that the public's interest lies in the
event itself, not in the individual's station in society." In holding that the
presence of an issue of public interest is a sufficient condition for the im-
position of the actual malice standard, the Court disregarded the distinc-
tion between public and private individuals.
32
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 33 protection of the media received a
403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Rosenbloom, the police charged the plaintiff, a private in-
dividual, with selling obscene literature. Id. at 32. A local radio station owned by
Metromedia, Inc., broadcast stories concerning Rosenbloom's arrest. Id. at 33. Rosenbloom
brought suit against Metromedia, Inc. for linking his name with a "smut literature racket"
and with "girlie-book peddlers." Id. at 36. Holding that the controversy over obscenity laws
was an issue of legitimate public concern, the Supreme Court applied the New York Times
standard of knowing or reckless falsity, even though plaintiff was a private individual. Id. at
40.
, Id. at 29. There was no majority opinion in Rosenbloom. Justice Brennan, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, wrote the plurality opinion. Id. Justice Brennan
stated that the actual malice standard applied in defamation actions brought by private in-
dividuals in cases involving public interest. Id. at 31-32. Justice White concurred in the
holding that the focus is on whether the issue is of general concern, but would have limited
the holding to the facts of the case. Id. at 62. Justice Black agreed on the broader ground
that all defamation actions against the media are unconstitutional, regardless of the plain-
tiff's status. Id. at 57. Justices Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart dissented. Id. at 30. Justice
Douglas did not take part in either the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
I Id. at 43. Justice Brennan stated that the scope of the first amendment included not
only political discussion, but also matters of social and economic concern, artistic endeavors,
and in general anything tending to improve the public's understanding of contemporary
society. Id.
31 Id.
' Id. The Court's decision offered almost no guidance to lower federal courts in apply-
ing the public interest test. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418.U.S. at 354. In Gertz, Justice
Blackmun specifically stated that he was joining the majority opinion solely in the effort to
eliminate the uncertainty engendered by the Rosenbloom decision. Id.
While prior to Rosenbloom publishers had to decide whether an individual was a
public figure, after Rosenbloom publishers had to determine whether a story was a matter
of public interest. Robertson, supra note 16, at 206-09. In practice, courts equated public in-
terest with newsworthiness, which in effect allowed the media to determine the limits of the
law of defamation. Id. Some commentators saw the Supreme Court as moving toward an ab-
solute protection of the news media. Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitu-
tional Policy Making, 61 MINN. L. REV. 645, 667 (1977; Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the
First Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 267, 283-84; The Supreme
Court 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REV. 38, 222 (1971).
3 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Subsequent to the conviction of a Chicago policeman for the
murder of a 17-year old youth, the victim's family retained Gertz as an attorney to repre-
sent them in a civil action against the officer. Id. at 326. American Opinion, a magazine own-
ed and published by the John Birch Society, characterized the policeman's conviction as part
of a communist plot to undermine law enforcement agencies. Id. While Gertz had not par-
ticipated in the criminal prosecution, American Opinion nevertheless included Gertz in the
1332 [Vol. 39:1327
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severe setback. 4 In Gertz, the Supreme Court reconsidered the question
whether the actual malice standard should apply to private plaintiffs in
defamation actions." Focusing on the tension existing between the need
to avoid self-censorship and the fundamental concern with preserving
one's dignity, 6 the Court rejected the Rosenbloom public interest test.
The Court held that the public interest test failed to achieve a fair
balance between the competing interests of the first amendment and the
law of defamation and retreated to the public figure test enunciated in
Curtis.8
Seeking to clarify the reasoning set forth in Curtis,9 the Gertz Court
further developed its discussion of the underlying factors involved in
story. Id. The magazine labeled Gertz a "Leninist" and a "communist fronter" and stated
that Gertz once had been an official in the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy." Id.
Gertz brought a defamation suit against the magazine following publication of the article.
Id. The Supreme Court held Gertz did not qualify as a public figure. Id. Rejecting the
Rosenbloom public interest test, the Court awarded damages without requiring Gertz to
show actual malice. Id. at 352.
See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 451 (1975).
418 U.S. at 322.
Id. at 341. In Gertz, the Supreme Court stated that the interest in freedom of ex-
pression is not the only value at stake. Id. The Court quoted Justice Stewart concerning the
importance of protecting an individual's interest in his good name for it "reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept
at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." Id.
, Id. at 346. Gertz was reversed and remanded in a four-one-four decision. Id. at 324.
Justices Powell, Stewart, Marshall, and Rhenquist comprised the plurality, with Justice
Blackmun concurring specially. Id. Justice Blackmun had joined the plurality in Rosenbloom
because he had seen the decision as a natural extension of the New York Times doctrine. Id.
at 353. Justice Blackmun, however, recognized the need for definiteness in the area of
defamation and therefore added his vote to create a majority in Gertz. Id. at 354. Justice
Blackmun was able to consent to the Gertz approach because he believed the Gertz decision
still allowed the press sufficient breathing space to carry out their duties vigorously. Id.
Id. at 346. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell offered two reasons for the Court's
rejection of the Rosenbloom test. Id. First, the Justice stated that the Rosenbloom decision
did not establish a fair accomodation between the law of defamation and freedom of expres-
sion. Id. Justice Powell noted that under the public interest test a private individual who is
injured by defamatory falsehood concerning a public issue must meet the stringent stan-
dard of "actual malice" before he may recover damages. Id. At the same time, a publisher of
a defamatory error not related to a public issue may be held liable under a state statute im-
posing liability without fault, even if the publisher had made every reasonable attempt to
prevent such an error. Id. Concerned over such results, Justice Powell condemned the
public interest test and held that states may not establish strict liability statutes. Id. at 347.
The second reason for the majority's displeasure with the Rosenbloom decision arose
from the Court's concern over allowing judges to determine whether an issue is one of
public interest. Id. at 346. Justice Powell stated that such a task was an inappropriate one
for judges. Id. See generally Robertson, supra note 16, at 213, 236; Brosnahan, supra note 2,
at 788-91. One writer has drawn attention to the Time, Inc. v. Firestone opinion in which the
Supreme Court made the type of ad hoe decision the Court had disapproved of in Gertz.
Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1071. In Firestone, the Court held
that divorce is not a matter of public interest. Id. The Court., however, could have avoided
making such a determination if it had focused on the plaintiff's behavior, for Mary Firestone
was not attempting to influence the public, but only avail herself of court procedures. Id.
" See text accompanying notes 20-27 supra.
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determining whether an individual is a public figure .4  The Supreme
Court identified the elements of self-help and assumption of the risk as
the operative principles behind the public figure doctrine.4 1 The Court
stressed the fact that public figures generally enjoy a substantial degree
of access to the media, and therefore, are able to minimize effectively the
impact of adverse statements on their reputations.42 Private individuals,
however, are unable to avail themselves of the remedy of counter-
argument and thus are more deserving of the Court's protection.43
In discussing the theory of assumption of the risk, the Supreme
Court emphasized the fact that public officials and public figures open
themselves up to public inspection in pursuing governmental offices and
the public spotlight." The Court held that while the media may assume
that public officials and public figures have exposed themselves volun-
tarily to the increased risk of defamation, such a presumption is inap-
propriate in relation to a private citizen because he has neither sought a
public office nor become a major force in the ordering of society.4"
The Supreme Court stated that the proper focus of the public figure
test should be on the nature and extent of the individual's participation
in the controversy, not on the controversy itself.46 The Supreme Court
emphasized three factors involved in analyzing a plaintiff's
418 U.S. at 344-46.
41 Id.
41 Id. The Court noted, however, that often the opportunity to rebut a falsehood is an
inadequate remedy. Id. at 344 n.9. Critics have questioned the viability to access to the
press as a remedy. See Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal Regula-
tion of Public Communication, 47 TEx. L. REV. 650, 654-55 (1968); Gertz and the Public
Figure Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1082-83. The number of people who can "command" ac-
cess to the media is small. Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1082. Nor
is there certainty that a person will be afforded as much attention in countering the state-
ment as was devoted to the initial statement. Id. This is especially true in the case of radio
and television broadcasting. Shapo, supra, at 654. The impact of the defamatory material is
immediate and pervasive. Id. Retractions will be ineffective in situations where listeners
leave the room or where programs are not presented regularly. Id. at 655. Thus, as Justice
Powell recognized, "the truth rarely catches up with a lie." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. at 344.
,s 418 U.S. at 344.
" Id. Justice Powell maintained that the public has a legitimate interest not only in
the formal duties of an officer, but also in his fitness for the office. Id. The Court held that
the personal attributes of honesty or malfeasance are particularly germane to the issue of
whether a person is a responsible candidate. Id. at 345.
11 Id. The Court left open the possiblity that a person could become a public figure in-
voluntarily, but stated that such an occurrence would be rare. Id. Commentators have inter-
preted the Supreme Court's decision in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), as im-
pliedly abandoning the involuntary public figure category. See Ashdown, Gertz and
Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61 MINN. L. REv. 645, 660 (1977); Com-
ment, The Evolution of the Public Figure Doctrine in Defamation Actions, 41 OHIO ST. L.
REV. 1009, 1021 (1980); Casenote, The Supreme Court Places Further Limitations on
Designation as a "Public Figure" in Libel Actions, 1980 B.Y. U. L. REV. 450, 468.
" 418 U.S. at 352. In an attempt to further refine the public figure doctrine, the Court
grouped public figures into two categories. Id. Recognizing a difference between all purpose
and limited purpose public figures, the Court stated that all purpose figures are those who
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involvement.47 The elements include ascertaining the plaintiffs role in
the dispute, determining whether the plaintiff has access to effective
channels of communication, and focusing on the voluntariness of plain-
tiff's participation in the controversy. 8
In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,49 the Supreme Court
recently was confronted with the issue of whether the lapse of time be-
tween a public controversy and a defamatory statement affects the
status of a public figure. Expressly reserving opinion on this issue," the
Supreme Court failed to resolve the question of whether the passage of
time dissipates the status of a public figure.5 While the majority declined
to address the issue, Justices Blackmun and Brennan expressed their
views in separate opinions on the effect of the passage of time.2
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun
contended that the passage of time is a relevant factor in determining
whether a person retains his status as a public figure. 3 Focusing on the
two underlying principles involved in the public figure doctrine, 4 Justice
have attained pervasive fame or notoriety. Id. Limited purpose figures are those who have
voluntarily injected themselves into a particular controversy. Id. The Court stated in either
situation such persons have assumed a special role in the resolution of public issues. Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
" 443 U.S. 157 (1979). In Wolston, the defendant had published a book entitled KGB:
The Secret Work of Soviet Agents, which falsely identified Ilya Wolston as a Soviet agent
in the United States. Id. at 159-60. While Wolston had been convicted on contempt charges
for failing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating Soviet activities in the United
States, he had never been indicted or tried on espionage charges. Id. Since Wolston had not
entered the controversy voluntarily, nor ever spoken to the media regarding the grand jury
proceedings, the Supreme Court held that Wolston did not qualify as a public figure. Id. at
167. In the appellate trial of Wolston, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had
arrived at a contrary finding. 578 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court held that Wolston
was a public figure. Id. Focusing on Wolston's failure to appear before the grand jury, the
court stated that such an action amounted to a voluntary entrance into the public spotlight.
d 443 U.S. at 166 n.7. Prior to Wolston, the Supreme Court had considered the issue of
time only once before. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87 n.14 (1966). In Rosenblatt, the
Supreme Court dealt with an issue related to the question of the passage of time. Id. The
Court noted that there may be cases where a person is so far removed from a former posi-
tion of authority that comment on the manner in which he performed his office may no
longer command the interest required to justify the application of the New York Times
rule. Id.
" 443 U.S. at 170. Justice Blackmun noted that the plaintiff at oral argument had aban-
doned the contention that the passage of time had eradicated his status as a public figure.
Id. Justice Blackmun stated that the plaintiff's decision to forgo the assertion was based on
the fact that both the district court and the D.C. Court of Appeals had considered the issue
expressly and found that the intervening sixteen years had not erased the plaintiff's status
as a public figure. Id. The Justice stated that since the plaintiff's abandonment of the issue
of the passage of time was merely a strategicfdecision, consideration of the issue was not
precluded by the failure of the plaintiff to argue it. Id.
"Id. at 169-72.
"Id. at 170.
" See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra.
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Blackmun stated that the elements of access to the media and assump-
tion of the risk are affected directly by the lapse of time.5
Justice Blackmun maintained that an individual's access to the press
is dependent on the media's interest in the controversy." The Justice
suggested that since the passage of time frequently operates to diminish
the public's interest in a controversy, the effect of time may be to hinder
substantially an individual's opportunity to rebut defamatory
statements. 7
Justice Blackmun also discussed the notion of assumption of the
risk.58 In determining how much weight should be accorded to the ele-
ment of time, the Justice looked to the anticipations of the plaintiff as
the time of his involvement in the controversy. 9 Justice Blackmun sug-
gested that a plaintiffs efforts to regain his anonymity are also to be
considered in determining whether a person retains his public figure
status after the passage of years. In fact, the Justice stated that in cer-
tain instances a plaintiffs return to private life may be held to negate
any risks the individual may be said to have originally assumed."
Justice Blackmun focused his analysis of the issue of the passage of
time on a distinction between historical and contemporaneous reporting,
maintaining that the need for the public figure doctrine is not as urgent
in cases involving historical commentary.2 Justice Blackmun stated that
historians have more of an opportunity to search for and examine the ac-
443 UsS. at 170-71.
Id. at 170.
17 Id. at 170. One commentator has suggested that the principle of counterargument is
a weak link in the public figure doctrine. See Gertz and the Public Figure Doctrine, supra
note 16, at 1082; note 42 supra. Justice Powell in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. stated that
while the self-help remedy of rebuttal may be inadequate to counter the harm of defama-
tion, rebuttal is nevertheless a relevant factor. 318 U.S. at 345 n.9. In Hutchinson v. Prox-
mire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), the Supreme Court held that to constitute a public figure, an in-
dividual's access to the media must be "regular and continuing." Id. at 136. The holding in
Proxmire indicates that the Court continues to consider the theory of access to the media as
a viable method of counter-balancing defamatory statements. See Gertz and the Public
Figure Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1082.
443 U.S. at 171.
" Id. The evaluation of a plaintiff's anticipations will differ according to the plaintiff's
position in society. Obviously, a spy will be less interested in public exposure than a can-
didate running for office.
60 Id.
" Id. For example, Justice Blackmun recognized that in Wolston the plaintiff may be
said to have assumed the risk of public scrutiny by ignoring the grand jury subpoena in
1958. Id. The Justice stated, however, that Wolston's successful attempt to return to
private life negated any assumption that he had accepted the risk of public exposure sixteen
years later. Id.
6 Id. Justice Blackmun argued that while historical writing is not less important than
contemporaneous writing, the conditions under which the two professions work are dif-
ferent. Id. The Justice emphasized the fact that contemporaneous reporters, unlike




curacy of their sources than reporters who are faced with the immediate
and pressing time constraints of deadlines.13 Thus, Justice Blackmun con-
tended that the addition of the factor of time to the public figure doc-
trine does not endanger the right to freedom of expression since
historical reporting does not require the same degree of protection as
contemporaneous reporting."
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, advocated the view that as
long as the controversy involved is one of legitimate public concern, the
issue of the passage of time will not be a determinative factor. Reminis-
cent of his opinion in Rosenbloom,66 Justice Brennan's dissent focused on
the public's interest in the controversy rather than on the plaintiffs
role. While Justice Brennan appears to have conceded that the passage
of time may be a relevant factor, he nevertheless minimized its impor-
tance to the public figure doctrine by emphasizing the public interest
aspect of the controversy. 8
In a recent Sixth Circuit decision, the court addressed the issue of
whether the passage of time affects the status of a public figure. 9 In
Street v. National Broadcasting Co.,70 the Sixth Circuit held that the
plaintiff retained her public figure status for the purpose of discussing
the controversy forty years after its occurrence. 1 On April 22, 1976, and
on January 3, 1977, the National Broadcasting Co. (NBC), televised an
historical drama entitled "Judge Horton and the Scottsboro Boys. ' 2 The
Id. The Justice conceded that one may be a public figure for purposes of contem-
poraneous reporting of a controversial event, yet not be a public figure for purposes of
historical commentary on the same occurrence. Id.
64 Id. Justice Blackmun alluded to the Court's ever present concern over the balance
between the first amendment and the law of defamation. See text accompanying notes 2-3
supra.
6 443 U.S. at 172. Justice Brennan agreed with the appellate court's finding that a
legitimate public interest was at issue. Id. The appellate court held that the security of the
United States is always an issue of importance to the public. 578 F.2d at 431.
See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
67 443 U.S. at 172. While Justice Brennan contended that Wolston was a public figure,
he would have reversed and remanded the decision on the issue of whether evidence of ac-
tual malice was present. Id.
" Id. In Rosenbloom, Justice Brennan recognized the fact that a public figure's ability
to respond through the media depends on the media's interest in the story. 403 U.S. at 46.
Since continued interest in an event is an unpredictable factor, the Justice considered the
opportunity for rebuttal to be an ineffective remedy. Id.; see note 44 supra. Justice Brennan
suggested that the way to rectify such a weakness is to ensure the ability of plaintiffs to re-
spond to defamatory statements. 403 U.S. at 46.
" Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3477 (December 15, 1981).
70 Id.
T' Id. at 1235.
72 Brief for Appellee at 2, Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.
1981). The movie was based on a chapter from a book entitled Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the
American South. 645 F.2d at 1230. The author, Dr. Daniel Carter, relied heavily on Judge
Horton's findings during the 1933 trial, the transcript of the trial, newspaper articles and in-
terviews with Judge Horton and others. Id.
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television presentation was based upon an incident involving nine black
youths accused of raping two white women in 1931.13 The production em-
phasized the role of the presiding judge, James E. Horton, in the 1933
trial of the State of Alabama versus Haywood Patterson. Victoria Price
Street, then known as Victoria Price, was the principal prosecution
witness in the rape trials of the nine blacks. 4 Judge Horton's findings
during the 1933 trial provided the basis for the portrayal of the
plaintiff.75 The movie presents Mrs. Street in an unfavorable light, as a
promiscuous woman intent on sending nine innocent blacks to the elec-
tric chair for a crime they did not commit. 6
Subsequent to the production's airing, Mrs. Street brought charges
against NBC for invasion of privacy and defamation of character. The
district court found that Mrs. Street was not a public figure, but
directed a verdict for defendant on the grounds that there was no
negligence involved in publishing the defamatory matter. On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit held that Mrs. Street qualified as a public figure. 9 Find-
ing in favor of the defendant, the court stated that the action for defama-
tion could not stand because the plaintiff had failed to meet the New
York Times standard of actual malice."
The Sixth Circuit considered the defendant's first amendment
defenses, looking specifically at the constitutional issue of whether the
plaintiff should be characterized as a public figure.' In determining
" 645 F.2d at 1229-30.
71 Id. Immediately after the alleged rape the nine blacks were tried and convicted. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the defendants had been denied
counsel. Id. Patterson was the first defendant retried. Id. He was convicted by a jury and
sentenced to death. Id. at 1230. Finding that the evidence was insufficient, Judge Horton set
aside the verdict. Id. Patterson was retried on substantially the same evidence before
another judge who allowed the jury's verdict of guilty to stand. Id. Patterson's conviction
was affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the conviction because blacks had been excluded from the juries. Id. At Pattersons's fourth
retrial, he was convicted and sentenced to 75 years in prison. Id.
"' Id. at 1237 app. (Judge Horton's unreported opinion of the 1933 trial). The Sixth Cir-
cuit held that while many of the scenes contain actual quotations from the trial manuscripts,
the movie is not an entirely accurate account of the trial. Id. at 1233.
11 Id. at 1232. In the movie, NBC inaccurately stated that Mrs. Street was dead. Id. at
1230. Plaintiff informed NBC that she was living subsequent to the first broadcast of "Judge
Horton and the Scottsboro Boys." Id. NBC then deleted the statement that plaintiff was no
longer living when the movie was reaired. Id.
" Id. at 1229. Mrs. Street based her libel and invasion of privacy claims on nine scenes
in the movie. Id. at 1230. The Sixth Circuit agreed with plaintiff that the play presented her
in a very unfavorable manner. Id.
"' Street v. National Broadcasting Co., No. Civ-4-76-31 (E.D. Tenn., August 11, 1977).
" 645 F.2d at 1229.
so Id.
"1 Id. at 1232. The Sixth Circuit discussed the common law defenses asserted by the
defendant of fair comment, truth, and fair reporting of judicial proceedings. Id. at 1232-33.
The court stated that the defense of fair comment failed because the characterization of Vic-
toria Price was not expressed as a matter of opinion, but as a fact. Id. at 1233. The Sixth Cir-
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whether Mrs. Street was a public figure, the Sixth Circuit applied the
Gertz test.8" The Street court interpreted the Gertz decision as
establishing a two-part test." The first step of the analysis involves ex-
amining whether a public controversy exists, while the second step
focuses on the nature and extent of the plaintiff's involvement in the
public controversy." The court identified three elements as involved in
examining the plaintiff's participation in the dispute. 5 The elements in-
clude ascertaining whether the plaintiff played a prominent role in the
controversy, whether the plaintiff had access to the media, and whether
the plaintiff voluntarily entered into the dispute."8
Executing the first step, the Street court held that the Scottsboro
trials were of nationwide significance and therefore qualified as a public
controversy.' The Sixth Circuit stated that the Scottsboro trials not
only drew the attention of millions, but also were instrumental in shap-
ing the development of the black citizens' right to equal treatment in the
judicial system.' In applying the second step of the test, the Sixth Cir-
cuit found that Mrs. Street fulfilled all three requirements. 9 The court
held that as the main prosecutrix Mrs. Street played a prominent role in
the proceedings." The court viewed the fact that Mrs. Street actively in-
terviewed with the press in an attempt to influence the outcome of the
trial as evidence that she had sufficient access to channels of communica-
tion.9 Furthermore, the Street court held that Mrs. Street's encourage-
ment of public interest in her plight exemplified her voluntary participa-
tion in the controversy.2
cuit also held that the findings of Judge Horton do not establish immutably the truthfulness
of Victoria Price Street's testimony. Id. Rather, the issue of truth remains an open question,
and cannot be asserted as a defense. Id. In relation to the common law defense of fair repor-
ting of judicial proceedings, the Sixth Circuit held that since the movie focused only on
Judge Horton's perspective, the necessary elements of balance and neutrality were missing
and, therefore, the defense could not be maintained successfully. Id.
8 Id.; see text accompanying notes 39-48 supra.
13 645 F.2d at 1234. The Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Gertz appears to be consistent
with the Supreme Court's position on the public figure doctrine. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 t1976); Note, Public Figures, Private Figures & Public Interest, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 157, 175 (1977).
645 F.2d at 1234.
85 Id.
"Id.
t Id The Sixth Circuit stated that the elements constituting a public controversy





Id. at 1234-35. The Sixth Circuit confessed to having some difficulty with the ques-
tion of whether Mrs. Street's participation was voluntary. Id. The court found the issue of
voluntariness related to the question of truth. Id. If Mrs. Street had been raped, the court
stated her involvement in the trial would have been involuntary. Id. However, if she falsely
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Finding that Mrs. Street was a public figure in 1933, the issue then
became whether she retained her status after the passage of forty years.
The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that Mrs. Street lost her public
figure status over the intervening time.3 The Street court based its
discussion on an interpretation of case law and on an analysis of the
malice standard. 4 In looking to previous case law, the Sixth Circuit cited
a recent Fifth Circuit opinion in support of its holding. 5 The Sixth Cir-
cuit reiterated the Fifth Circuit's contention set forth in Brewer v. Mem-
phis Publishing Co. that while the passage of time may not erase an in-
dividual's status as a public figure, time may operate to reduce the range
of topics protected by the malice standard."
Seeking to corroborate its stance further, the Sixth Circuit referred
to Meeropol v. Nizer,1 a Second Circuit decision. The Sixth Circuit inter-
preted the Second Circuit as operating on the silent assumption that
public figures retained their status regardless of the passage of time.
The Sixth Circuit found such a presumption to be implicit support for
the ruling that the passage of forty years did not affect Mrs. Street's
status as a public figure.9
The Sixth Circuit also cited two pre-Gertz decisions as authority for
the court's holding in Street.' In Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corporation'
accused the black youths, her participation could be said to have been voluntary. Id.
Holding that the operation of the law of libel should not depend on the media's conjecture as
to a woman's virtue, the Sixth Circuit looked to other factors, such as her pursuit of publicity,
as evidence of Mrs. Street's voluntary involvement. Id.
" Id. at 1235.
94 Id.
" Id. In Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), cerL denied,
101 S.Ct. 3112 (1981), the plaintiff, Anita Wood Brewer, sued a newspaper for publishing an
article intimating that plaintiff was reviving a romantic relationship with Elvis Presley. Id
at 1240. The plaintiff was a nationally known entertainer who attained her fame through her
relationship with Elvis Presley during the 1950's. Id. at 1248. Plaintiff claimed that since her
marriage in 1964, and her subsequent retreat from the public spotlight, her status as a
public figure had dissipated. Id. at 1249. The Fifth Circuit held that because Mrs. Brewer's
name had continued to appear in stories about Presley after her retirement, and since the
subject of the article related to one of the causes of the plaifitiff's fame, plaintiff retained
her status as a public figure for purposes of the article. Id. at 1257.
645 F.2d at 1235.
' Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). In
Meeropol, the plaintiffs sued defendants for defamation arising out of an account of the
Rosenberg trial entitled The Implosion Conspiracy published in 1974. Id. at 1064. The plain-
tiffs, the natural children of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, were held to be public figures by
virtue of their parentage. Id. The court held that even if some of the statements in The Im-
plosion Conspiracy were found to be defamatory, plaintiffs, as public figures, were required
to meet the malice standard to recover damages. Id. at 1066.
"s 645 F.2d at 1235.
9 Id.
100 Id.
.01 13 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940). In Sidis, the plaintiff was a
famous child prodigy who had excited a great deal of attention in 1910. Id. at 807. Sidis
sought to conceal his identity in later life by moving to a shabby part of Boston and taking
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and Time, Inc. v. Johnston,"2 the Second and Fourth Circuits focused on
the public interest aspect of the cases. The courts held that the public's
concern in the controversy outweighed the plaintiff's right to protect his
reputation."3 Thus, the Sixth Circuit stated that deference to the
public's interest in a controversy supports a finding that the passage of
time does not affect the public figure doctrine."4
In analyzing the issue of the passage of time, the Sixth Circuit ex-
amined the policy behind the public figure doctrine.0 ' The court stated
that the Supreme Court established the malice standard to protect the
first amendment's right of freedom of expression."' The Sixth Circuit
also referred to the nation's commitment to unfettered debate and focus-
ed on the need of the press to remain free from threats of liability. °7
Refusing to recognize a distinction between historians and contem-
poraneous reporters, the Sixth Circuit held that while an historian may
not operate under pressing time constraints, he nevertheless is faced
with similar impediments.' °8 The court advanced the contention that the
accuracy and verifiability of sources available to a historian are not
necessarily enhanced by the passage of time."9 The Street court referred
to instances in which memories fade, witnesses forget, and sources
disappear."' The court, therefore, perceived the extension of the malice
on a position as an insignificant clerk. Id. In 1937, Sidis was the subject of a brief
biographical sketch in The New Yorker. Id. The article described, in merciless detail, the
early accomplishments of Sidis and his later attempts to avoid public scrutiny. Id. The arti-
cle discussed the plaintiff's personal habits in depth, remarking on his "curious" laugh, his
manner of speech, and untidy room. Id. Sidis subsequently sued The New Yorker for inva-
sion of privacy. Id. The Second Circuit held that while Sidis was a public figure who had
since sought and attained anonymity, the public interest in his career outweighed his desire
for privacy. Id.
"1 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971). In Time, a former professional basketball player
brought a libel action against the publisher of Sports Illustrated. Id. at 379. The plaintiff, an
assistant basketball coach at Wake Forest University, had been retired from professional
basketball for nine years at the time of the publication of the article. Id. The article discussed
the career of Bill Russell, a basketball star of the Boston Celtics, and referred to an incident
during which Russell was said to have "destroyed" Johnston on the basketball court. Id.
Johnston maintained that his reputation as a coach was damaged by the article. Id.
Johnston argued that the New York Times rule did not apply because he had shed his
public figure status over the intervening years. Id. at 380. The court held that since the
event between Russell and Johnston remained a matter of public interest, plaintiff was re-
quired to prove malice regardless of the passage of time. Id. at 381. Furthermore, the court
stated that Johnston's contention that he had shed his public figure status was patently in-
consistent with his claim for damages to his reputation as a coach. Id. at 381.
03 113 F.2d at 809; 448 F.2d at 381.
10 645 F.2d at 1235.
103 Id. at 1236; see text accompanying note 19 supra.
10 645 F.2d at 1236.
10 Id. The Sixth Circuit stated that the public figure doctrine enables the media to
make information accessible to the public unencumbered by the threat of liability. Id.
106 Id.; see text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
10 645 F.2d at 1236.
110 Id.
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standard to encompass historical reporting as a natural and logical
development of the public figure doctrine."'
Examining only one of the two underpinnings of the public figure
doctrine, the Sixth Circuit held that a public figure does not lose access
to the media simply because of the passage of time.1 ' The court stated
that the importance of an event and society's need for information are
not diminished with the passage of time."' The Sixth Circuit held that as
long as the controversy remains alive, as in the present case, a public
figure must prove actual malice to recover under a defamation action
regardless of the intervention of time.
The Sixth Circuit's treatment of the issue of the passage of time is
cursory and evasive. Relying on case law which is unsupportive and an
anlysis of the public figure doctrine which is unsound, the Street court
failed to present a well reasoned decision. Citing Brewer v. Memphis
Co."' for support, the Sixth Circuit failed to examine fully the holding of
the Fifth Circuit's decision. In Brewer, the plaintiff sought to prove that
her status as a public figure had dissipated with the passage of years."6
Reiterating Justice Blackmun's discussion of whether the passage of
time affects the public figure doctrine,"' the Fifth Circuit nevertheless
held that based on the facts in the Brewer case such an analysis was in-
apposite." 8
One of the reasons for the Fifth Circuit's determination that Justice
Blackmun's analysis did not apply was the fact that Brewer involved an
incident of contemporaneous reporting, not historical commentary." 9 In
addition, the Fifth Circuit's suggestion that time may narrow the range
of topics, presupposes, not undermines, the theory that time affects a
plaintiff's status as a public figure."' Therefore, the Sixth Circuit incor-
rectly cited to Brewer for the proposition that time does not operate to
diminish a public figure's status.
"1 Id.
" Id. The two underlying principles of the public figure doctrine are access to the
media and assumption of the risk. See text accompanying notes 39-45 supra.
" 645 F.2d at 1236.
1, Brief for Appellee at 6, Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.
1981). In the brief for appellee, the defendant presented extensive evidence as to the
newsworthiness of the topic. Id.
"' 646 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980); text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
16 646 F.2d at 1257.
"1 Id.; see text accompanying notes 54-61 supra.
626 F.2d at 1257.
119 Id. The Fifth Circuit offered two other reasons for the applicability of Justice
Blackmun's analysis. Id. The court referred to the fact that Brewer v. Memphis Co. involved a
question where the plaintiff's public figure status was not tied to a particular public con-
troversy. Id. Second, the Fifth Circuit stated that while Anita Brewer may have sought
anonymity eight years before the publication of the article, her name had continued to ap-





The Sixth Circuit mistakenly cited Meeropol v. Nizer"2' for the prop-
osition that the passage of time does not diminish a public figure's
status. In Meeropol, the sons of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were held to
be public figures for purposes of subsequent commentary on the
Rosenberg trials."n The'Sixth Circuit contended that implicit in the deci-
sion is the holding that the passage of time does not affect the status of a
public figure."n The issue of the passage of time, however, was never
presented to the court. Nor did the Meeropol court ever address the
issue in its opinion. Since the Second Circuit did not analyze the issue of
the passage of time, the Meeropol decision fails to provide support for
the Sixth Circuit's holding that Mrs. Street retained her status as a
public figure regardless of the intervention of forty years.
The Sixth Circuit's reliance on Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.24 and
Time, Inc. v. Johnston,2 ' was misplaced. The flaw inherent in the two
cases arises from the fact that the cases are grounded in a public in-
terest perspective. In Gertz, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the
Rosenbloom public interest test and held that the focus of the public
figure doctrine should be on the nature and extent of the individual's in-
volvement in the controversy and not on the controversy itself.'26
Furthermore, in Time, Inc. v. Johnston the Fifth Circuit resolved the
issue of the passage of time by relying heavily on an analogy between in-
vasion of privacy and the law of defamation." The Fifth Circuit deferred
to a principle established in Cohen v. Marx,' a 1949 invasion of privacy
case, which held that once a plaintiff seeks publicity, he relinquishes his
right to privacy and cannot later rescind his waiver." The waiver
theory enunciated in Cohen v. Marx, however, loses force in light of the
Restatement of Torts position on the issue. 3 ' The Restatement (Second)
125 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977); text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
560 F.2d at 1066.
645 F.2d at 1235.
224 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); text accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
' 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971); text accompanying notes 102-04 supra.
1z, 418 U.S. at 346; text accompanying notes 33-48 supra.
1= 448 F.2d at 381.
II 94 Cal.App.2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1949). In Cohen, the plaintiff was a retired profes-
sional boxer who brought an action against Groucho Marx for invasion of privacy. Id. at 321.
On the program "You Bet Your Life," Marx stated: "I once managed a prizefighter, Can-
vasback Cohen, I brought him out here, he got knocked out, and I made him walk back to
Cleveland." Id. The court denied the plaintiff relief, holding that when a person voluntarily
exposes himself to the public eye, he has waived his right of privacy and cannot rescind his
waiver at some later date. Id.
12 Id.
I0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 D, Comment k (1976). The Restatement main-
tains that while the lapse of time is not a determinative factor, courts should take into con-
sideration the element of time in determining.whether a public figure's privacy has been in-
vaded. Id; see Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal.App.3d 880, 891, 118
Cal.Rptr. 370, 378-79 (1974) (court held that mere lapse of time may provide basis for inva-
sion of privacy suit); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Company, 283 N.W.2d 289,
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of Torts suggests that a modern trend is developing in favor of consider-
ing the passage of time as a relevant factor in the law of invasion of
privacy. '" ' Therefore, the Sixth Circuit's reliance on Time, Inc. v.
Johnston is misplaced not only because the Time decision is based on a
newsworthiness standard expressly rejected by the Supreme Court, but
also because the decision draws an analogy to a principle of the law of in-
vasion of privacy which is currently undergoing revision.'
3
1
Not only does the Sixth Circuit rely on case law which is unsuppor-
tive of the court's holding, but the court's analysis of the public figure
doctrine is poorly reasoned. In dealing with the principles underlying
the public figure doctrine,'33 the Sixth Circuit dismissed the contention
that an individual's access to the press is affected by the passage of time,
even if that individual presently leads a reclusive life." The Sixth Cir-
cuit failed to present an analysis of the relationship between a plaintiff's
opportunity to counter defamatory remarks and the lapse of time. The
court neglected to discuss the facts of the case, apparently assuming
that Mrs. Street's acces to the media was unaffected by the intervention
of forty years. Such an assumption strikes at the heart of the public
figure doctrine, especially since the theory of access to the press is an
important component of the malice standard.' 35 Furthermore, the Sixth
Circuit failed to consider the concept of assumption of the risk, an intrin-
sic and fundamental aspect of the public figure doctrine. '36 If the passage
of time operates to restrict a public figure's access to the media, or acts
to negate one's assumption of the risks involved in being a public figure,
then such a factor is necessary in determining the plaintiff's status.
In dealing with the concept of the passage of time, the Sixth Circuit
appears to have adopted the approach Justice Brennan advocated in his
Wolston dissent.'7 Emphasizing the public interest aspect of the case,
the Street court relied heavily on the finding that the Scottsboro con-
troversy over the right of black citizens to a fair trial remains a
legitimate public concern.' 38 In light of the Supreme Court's rejection of
the public interest test in Gertz, the Sixth Circuit's endorsement of
Justice Brennan's approach appears to be unsound.
302 (Sup. Ct. Iowa 1979) (court cited to Restatement and held that passage of time is rele-
vant factor in determining whether publicity involves matter of legitimate public concern).
,.. See Wagner v. Fawcett Publication, 307 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 909 (1963); Conklin v. Sloss, 86 Cal.App.3d 241, 244-45, 150 Cal.Rptr. 121, 123 (1978);
Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal.3d 529, 538-39, 93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 872-73, 483 P.2d 34,
40-41 (1971); Swan, Publicity Invasion of Privacy: Constitutional and Doctrinal Difficulities
With a Developing Tort, 58 ORE. L. REV. 483, 483-87 (1980).
' Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal.App.3d 880, 891, 118 Cal.Rptr.
370, 378-79 (1974).
133 See text accompanying notes 39-45 supra.
1u 645 F.2d at 1236.
13 See text accompanying notes 39-45 supra.
13 645 F.2d at 1236.
'3 See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
' 645 F.2d at 1236.
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The Sixth Circuit's extension of the malice standard to cover in-
stances of historical commentary appears to conflict with recent
Supreme Court developments signaling a retreat from protection of the
first amendment. '39 Rejecting the distinction between historical and con-
temporary reporting, the Street court contended that the distance of
years does not make information more readily available or credible. 4 '
The focus of the distinction as suggested by Justice Blackmun, however,
is on the fact that reporters are faced with pressing deadlines and thus
are not always able to take advantage of certain investigative oppor-
tunities."' In establishing the malice standard, the Court was concerned
with time restraints, not with the quantity or quality of information
possessed by the reporter.' Therefore, proof of the availability or
credibility of sources should go to the issue of whether the historian was
negligent, or reckless, not whether the plaintiff should retain her public
figure status."4
The function of the public figure doctrine is to accommodate the
competing interests of the law of defamation and the right to freedom of
expression. 4 In seeking a balance between these interests, the law is
not concerned solely with the media's first amendment rights.''
Justification for an extension of the doctrine must be grounded in a
careful examination of the effects of the passage of time on one's ability
to rebut defamatory statements and one's assumption of the risks con-
comitant with the status of a public figure.
46
The Street court neglected to consider the facts of the case in arriv-
ing at a decision, and failed to evaluate what effect the lapse of time had
on Mrs. Street's access to effective channels of communication or
whether she had assumed the risk that forty years later she would be
branded a "whore." While the first amendment provides less protection
for those labeled public figures because they are more readily able to
rebut misstatements of fact,'4 to suggest that Mrs. Street would be able
to counter effectively a nationwide presentation of her involvement in
"' See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra. In Gertz, Justice Blackmun stated that
the rejection of the Rosenbloom test evidenced a withdrawal from increased protection of
the first amendment in favor of the law of defamation. 418 U.S. at 353. See generally L.
ELDREDGE, supra note 6, § 53, at 288; Robertson, supra note 16, at 199; Comment, The
Evolution of the Public Figure Doctrine in Defamation Actions, 41 OHIO ST. L. J. 1009, 1009
(1980).
1' 645 F.2d at 1236.
... See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
,.. 443 U.S. at 171.
... In Gertz, the Supreme Court left the responsibility of defining standards of liability
involving private individuals up to the states. 418 U.S. at 347; see text accompanying note
18 supra.
.. 418 U.S. at 325.
Id. at 341.
"' Id. at 344-45.
" See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
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the Scottsboro trials is untenable. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit should
have examined whether Mrs. Street assumed the risk of having personal
aspects of her life presented to the nation as a source of entertainment.
Considering that Mrs. Street was held to have assumed the risk of
defamation in 1933 due to her participation in an unknown number of in-
terviews, the need to reevaluate her status as a public figure after the
passage of forty years becomes even more crucial.' 8
Appearing to disregard the Supreme Court's recent rejection of the
public interest test in Gertz, Justice Brennan and the Sixth Circuit con-
tinue to emphasize the public interest aspect of the public figure doc-
trine. In view of the fact that the public figure doctrine rests on the prin-
ciples of access to the media and assumption of the risk, Justice
Blackmun maintained in Wolston that the passage of time may often be a
significant and important factor in determining whether an individual is
presently a public figure. While the Justice did not state that the
passage of time is a decisive factor, he nevertheless held such a factor to
be relevant in applying the principles of the public figure doctrine.
Therefore, Justice Blackmun's view appears to offer a more accurate and
incisive analysis of the effect of the passage of time on the public figure
doctrine than either Justice Brennan or the Sixth Circuit have proposed.
PATRICIA A. CALORE
,' Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d at 1246-50 (dissenting opinion); Wilson
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company, 642 F.2d 371, 374 (6th Cir. 1981) (Sixth Circuit
stated that access to the media must be "regular and continuing" to constitute effective ac-
cess to media); text accompanying note 57 supra.
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